A model of strategic behaviour in repeated games

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dc.contributor.author Bergin, James
dc.date.accessioned 2008-11-03T16:32:21Z
dc.date.available 2008-11-03T16:32:21Z
dc.date.copyright 1992 Department of Economics, Queen’s University en
dc.date.issued 1992
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Mathematical Economics en
dc.identifier.issn 0304-4068
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10197/635
dc.description.abstract This paper develops a general repeated game model over an arbitrary time domain. The paper considers the issue of formulating strategic behaviour in a general framework which includes continuous time behaviour. There are obvious requirements which a strategy must necessarily satisfy. These requirements are stated as axioms and within this axiomatic framework a class of strategies (called variable response strategies, VRS) is developed. In this class of strategy, a player is committed at any point in time to history independent behaviour for a positive length of time. However, this length of time of commitment depends on the way the history evolves locally. Thus, the speed of reaction to the evolution of the history is not bounded away from zero in the VRS formulation. Nevertheless, it is shown that these strategies generate unambiguous outcomes on any subgame and so are well defined. A characterization of the set of subgame perfect equilibria relative to variable response strategies is given. Following this discussion, we show that this class of strategy contains in a natural way a general class of differential game strategy. This result is of independent interest as it provides an alternative perspective on differential equations. The fact that VR strategies have a response time not bounded away from 0 is essential to this result. en
dc.format.extent 4304 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher Elsevier Science en
dc.relation.isversionof Bergin, J. (1989) "A model of strategic behaviour in repeated games". Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper No. 751. Ontario: Queen’s University, Department of Economics en
dc.subject.lcsh Game theory en
dc.subject.lcsh Equilibrium (Economics) en
dc.title A model of strategic behaviour in repeated games en
dc.type Journal Article en
dc.internal.authorurl James Bergin (web page) en
dc.internal.authorurl http://geary.ucd.ie/Table/About-Items/?ref=8236662 en
dc.internal.authorcontactother Email: berginj@ucd.ie; Tel: +353 1 716 4618 en
dc.internal.authorid UCD0002 en
dc.internal.availability Full text not available en
dc.internal.webversions Publisher's version en
dc.internal.webversions http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(92)90007-T en
dc.status Peer reviewed en
dc.identifier.volume 21 en
dc.identifier.issue 2 en
dc.identifier.startpage 113 en
dc.identifier.endpage 153 en
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/0304-4068(92)90007-T
dc.neeo.contributor Bergin|James|aut|UCD0002

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