A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games

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dc.contributor.author Bergin, James
dc.date.accessioned 2008-11-03T14:33:34Z
dc.date.available 2008-11-03T14:33:34Z
dc.date.copyright 1986 Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science en
dc.date.issued 1986-04
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10197/630
dc.description.abstract For two-sided informatin infinitely repeated incomplete information games it is shown that any vector payoff can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium vector payoff if and only if there is a markov chain (with a state space of player type distributions and vector payoffs) starting at that vector payoff and satisfying a set of incentive compatibility constraints. en
dc.format.extent 4304 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher Northwestern University. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Discussion Papers en
dc.relation.ispartofseries No 686 en
dc.subject.lcsh Game theory en
dc.subject.lcsh Markov processes en
dc.title A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.internal.authorurl James Bergin (web page) en
dc.internal.authorurl http://geary.ucd.ie/Table/About-Items/?ref=8236662 en
dc.internal.authorcontactother Email: berginj@ucd.ie; Tel: +353 1 716 4618 en
dc.internal.authorid UCD0002 en
dc.internal.availability Full text not available en
dc.internal.webversions Publisher's version en
dc.internal.webversions http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/686.pdf en
dc.status Not peer reviewed en
dc.neeo.contributor Bergin|James|aut|UCD0002


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