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Search Results for Collection: Geary Institute Research Collection
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(Queen’s University. Department of Economics, 2006-07)This paper characterizes long-run outcomes for broad classes of symmetric games, when players select actions on the basis of average historical performance. Received wisdom is that when agent’s interests are partially ...
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(Queen’s University. Department of Economics, 1999-02)This paper develops a dynamic evolutionary model in which agents make choices on the basis of relative performance criteria. We distinguish two classes of learned behavior: imitative dynamics and a new class of dynamics, ...
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(Blackwell, 1993-02)In this paper we develop a model of strategic behaviour in continuous time games of complete information, which includes conventional repeated games in discrete time as a special case. The model developed here admits a ...
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(Elsevier Science, 1993-10)In this paper we present a general framework for the discussion of renegotiation in repeated games, provide a new concept of "renegotiation-proof" equilibrium, and show how the framework clarifies and unifies existing work. ...
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(Elsevier Science, 1998-06)We study the implementation of social choice rules in incomplete information environments. A sufficiency condition called posterior reversal is given for extensive form implementation. The condition has a natural interpretation ...
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(Elsevier Science, 1989-02)It is shown that the set of sequential equilibria of an infinitely repeated incomplete information game coincides with a family of markov chains (with a state space of player type distributions and payoffs). Corresponding ...
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(Queen’s University. Department of Economics, 1992)In this paper we consider Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty. We prove existence of equilibrium when there is a general state space representing aggregate uncertainty. When the economy is stationary and ...
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(Queen’s University. Department of Economics, 1987)This paper provides a formulation of continuous time repeated games of complete information. A substantial part of the paper is concerned with the definition of a continuous time strategy and the association of outcomes ...
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(Northwestern University. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1986-07)
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(Université Catholique de Louvain. Center for Operations Research and Economics, 1990)