Beat 'em or join 'em? : export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets

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dc.contributor.author Neary, J. Peter
dc.contributor.author O'Sullivan, Paul
dc.date.accessioned 2011-07-25T14:22:23Z
dc.date.available 2011-07-25T14:22:23Z
dc.date.issued 1998-05-11
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10197/3045
dc.description.abstract This paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted. en
dc.description.sponsorship Not applicable en
dc.format.extent 5028840 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher University College Dublin. School of Economics en
dc.relation.ispartofseries UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series en
dc.relation.ispartofseries WP98/10 en
dc.subject Research and development en
dc.subject R&D spillovers en
dc.subject Cooperative agreements en
dc.subject Research Joint Ventures en
dc.subject Strategic trade policy en
dc.subject Export subsidies en
dc.subject Commitment en
dc.subject Dynamic consistency en
dc.subject.lcsh Research, Industrial--Mathematical models en
dc.subject.lcsh Commercial policy--Mathematical models en
dc.subject.lcsh Export subsidies--Mathematical models en
dc.title Beat 'em or join 'em? : export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.internal.availability Full text available en
dc.status Not peer reviewed en
dc.neeo.contributor Neary|J. Peter|aut|UCD0042 en
dc.neeo.contributor O'Sullivan|Paul|aut| en


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