DSpace
 

Research Repository UCD >
College of Human Sciences >
School of Economics >
Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/3043

Title: Strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies
Authors: Neary, J. Peter
Leahy, Dermot
Keywords: Learning by doing
R&D subsidies
Strategic trade policy
Export subsidies
Commitment
Dynamic consistency
Issue Date: 21-Jul-1998
Publisher: University College Dublin. School of Economics
Series/Report no.: UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series
WP98/14
Abstract: We characterize optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole's "fat cats and top dogs" taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the stategic substitutability between future policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and extensions to second-best, revenue-constrained and entry-promotion policies.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/3043
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat
WP 98-14b.pdf3.89 MBAdobe PDFView/Open
View Statistics

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

 

Valid XHTML 1.0! DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2010  Duraspace - Feedback