It is shown that the set of sequential equilibria of an infinitely repeated incomplete information game coincides with a family of markov chains (with a state space of player type distributions and payoffs). Corresponding ...
When the information of an agent is represented as a sigma algebra on a probability space, iterative public announcement of an aggregate statistic on posteriors leads to convergence of each agent's posterior distribution ...
Bergin, James(Queen’s University. Department of Economics, 1987)
This paper provides a formulation of continuous time repeated games of complete information. A substantial part of the paper is concerned with the definition of a continuous time strategy and the association of outcomes ...
Bergin, James(Queen’s University. Department of Economics, 1989)
This paper develops a general repeated game model over arbitrary time domain (which includes continuous time behaviour). A player is committed at any point in time to history independent behaviour for a positive length of ...
Bergin, James(Northwestern University. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1986-04)
For two-sided informatin infinitely repeated incomplete information games it is shown that any vector payoff can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium vector payoff if and only if there is a markov chain (with a state ...