This paper develops a dynamic evolutionary model in which agents make choices on the basis of relative performance criteria. We distinguish two classes of learned behavior: imitative dynamics and a new class of dynamics, ...
In this paper we develop a model of strategic behaviour in continuous time
games of complete information, which includes conventional repeated games
in discrete time as a special case. The model developed here admits a ...
In this paper we present a general framework for the discussion of renegotiation in repeated games, provide a new concept of "renegotiation-proof" equilibrium, and show how the framework clarifies and unifies existing work. ...
We study the implementation of social choice rules in incomplete information environments. A sufficiency condition called posterior reversal is given for extensive form implementation. The condition has a natural interpretation ...
It is shown that the set of sequential equilibria of an infinitely repeated incomplete information game coincides with a family of markov chains (with a state space of player type distributions and payoffs). Corresponding ...
In this paper we consider Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty. We prove existence of equilibrium when there is a general state space representing aggregate uncertainty. When the economy is stationary and ...
Bergin, James(Queen’s University. Department of Economics, 1987)
This paper provides a formulation of continuous time repeated games of complete information. A substantial part of the paper is concerned with the definition of a continuous time strategy and the association of outcomes ...
Recent evolutionary models have introduced "small mutation rates" as a way of refining predictions of long-run behavior. We show that this refinement effect can only be obtained by restrictions on how the magnitude of the ...