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Search Results for Collection: Institutes and Centres
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(Queen’s University. Department of Economics, 1999-02)This paper develops a dynamic evolutionary model in which agents make choices on the basis of relative performance criteria. We distinguish two classes of learned behavior: imitative dynamics and a new class of dynamics, ...
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(Blackwell, 1993-02)In this paper we develop a model of strategic behaviour in continuous time games of complete information, which includes conventional repeated games in discrete time as a special case. The model developed here admits a ...
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(Elsevier Science, 1993-10)In this paper we present a general framework for the discussion of renegotiation in repeated games, provide a new concept of "renegotiation-proof" equilibrium, and show how the framework clarifies and unifies existing work. ...
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(Elsevier Science, 1998-06)We study the implementation of social choice rules in incomplete information environments. A sufficiency condition called posterior reversal is given for extensive form implementation. The condition has a natural interpretation ...
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(Queen’s University. Department of Economics, 1992)In this paper we consider Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty. We prove existence of equilibrium when there is a general state space representing aggregate uncertainty. When the economy is stationary and ...
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(Université Catholique de Louvain. Center for Operations Research and Economics, 1990)
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(Econometric Society, 1996-07)Recent evolutionary models have introduced "small mutation rates" as a way of refining predictions of long-run behavior. We show that this refinement effect can only be obtained by restrictions on how the magnitude of the ...
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(Queen’s University. Department of Economics, 1997-01)We study the implementation of social choice rules in incomplete information environments. A sufficiency condition called posterior reversal is given for extensive form implementation. The condition has a natural interpretation ...
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(Elsevier Science, 1992)This paper develops a general repeated game model over an arbitrary time domain. The paper considers the issue of formulating strategic behaviour in a general framework which includes continuous time behaviour. There are ...
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(Elsevier Science, 1999-05)The goal of non-cooperative foundations is to provide credible non-cooperative models of negotiation and coalition formation whose equilibrium outcomes agree with a given cooperative solution. Here we argue that this goal ...