It is shown that the set of sequential equilibria of an infinitely repeated incomplete information game coincides with a family of markov chains (with a state space of player type distributions and payoffs). Corresponding ...
Bergin, James(Queen’s University. Department of Economics, 1987)
This paper provides a formulation of continuous time repeated games of complete information. A substantial part of the paper is concerned with the definition of a continuous time strategy and the association of outcomes ...
Bergin, James(Queen’s University. Department of Economics, 1989)
This paper develops a general repeated game model over arbitrary time domain (which includes continuous time behaviour). A player is committed at any point in time to history independent behaviour for a positive length of ...
Bergin, James(Northwestern University. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1986-04)
For two-sided informatin infinitely repeated incomplete information games it is shown that any vector payoff can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium vector payoff if and only if there is a markov chain (with a state ...
This paper extends the results of Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988) on the existence of equilibrium in anonymous sequential games. They prove existence in the case where the aggregate distribution of agents' characteristics ...