Parlane, Sarah(University College Dublin. School Of Economics, 2005-12-08)
This paper analyses strategic market allocation by two auctioneers holding substitutes. It characterizes both the cooperative and competitive outcomes. Under cooperation or competition with close substitutes, bidders are ...
This paper characterizes the optimal and efficient mechanisms to allocate simultaneously two substitute tasks to two suppliers. Two main results emerge from this analysis. First, even under some regularity conditions ...
In sectors with cumulative and complementry technologies, some rms build patent portfolios in order to block their competitors' access to the technology and/or to negociate cross licensing agreements. We propose a dynamic ...
We analyze non-cooperative R&D investment by two firms that already hold patents that they can assert against each other with probabilistic success. The market structure results from stochastic innovation and patent ...
This paper considers the allocation of essential patents by a profit maximizing monopoly. Using a model incorporating product differentiation and network externalities we show that fixed fee licences are optimal either ...
We characterize optimal IPO design in the presence of distinct adverse selection problems: one affecting the IPO stage and one arising in the after-market. Allocating shares to an investor with superior information in the ...
This paper analyses procurement when contractors have limited liability and when the sponsor cannot commit to any specific form of future negotiation. It shows that introducing limited liability enhances competition and ...
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