International R&D rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment

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Show simple item record Leahy, Dermot Neary, J. Peter 2010-01-15T15:16:36Z 2010-01-15T15:16:36Z 1995-05-09
dc.identifier.other 199509 en
dc.description.abstract We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home export subsidy, R&D subsidy and welfare are higher in an equilibrium in which government commitment is credible than in the dynamically consistent equilibrium without commitment. Commitment yields gains but so does unanticipated reneging, whereas reneging which is anticipated by firms yields the lowest welfare of all. en
dc.description.externalNotes A hard copy is available in UCD Library at GEN 330.08 IR/UNI en
dc.format.extent 536029 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher University College Dublin. School of Economics en
dc.relation.ispartofseries UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series en
dc.relation.ispartofseries WP95/9 en
dc.subject Research & Development en
dc.subject R&D subsidies en
dc.subject Strategic trade policy en
dc.subject Export subsidies en
dc.subject Commitment en
dc.subject Dynamic consistency en
dc.subject.classification F12 en
dc.subject.classification L13 en
dc.subject.lcsh Research, Industrial en
dc.subject.lcsh Industrial policy en
dc.subject.lcsh Commercial policy en
dc.subject.lcsh Export subsidies en
dc.subject.lcsh Oligopolies en
dc.title International R&D rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.internal.authorurl Dermot Leahy (web page) en
dc.internal.authorurl en
dc.internal.authorid UCD0042 en
dc.internal.availability Full text available en
dc.status Not peer reviewed en
dc.type.capturetechnique PDFimage en
dc.neeo.contributor Leahy|Dermot|aut| en
dc.neeo.contributor Neary|J. Peter|aut|UCD0042 en

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