Learning by doing, precommitment and infant-industry protection

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dc.contributor.author Leahy, Dermot
dc.contributor.author Neary, J. Peter
dc.date.accessioned 2010-01-12T14:31:38Z
dc.date.available 2010-01-12T14:31:38Z
dc.date.issued 1994-04-24
dc.identifier.other 199405 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1748
dc.description.abstract This paper examines the implications for strategic trade policy of different assumptions about precommitment. In a dynamic oligopoly game with learning by doing, the optimal first-period subsidy is lower if firms cannot precommit to future output than if they can; and is lower still if the government cannot precommit to future subsidies. In the linear case the optimal subsidy is increasing in the rate of learning with precommitment, but decreasing in it if the government cannot precommit. The infant-industry argument is thus reversed in the absence of precommitment, which has important implications for economic policy in dynamic environments. en
dc.description.externalNotes A hard copy is available in UCD Library at GEN 330.08 IR/UNI en
dc.format.extent 1050216 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher University College Dublin. School of Economics en
dc.relation.ispartofseries UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series en
dc.relation.ispartofseries WP94/5 en
dc.subject Strategic trade policy en
dc.subject Precommitment en
dc.subject Learning by doing en
dc.subject Infant industry protection en
dc.subject Time consistency en
dc.subject.classification F12 en
dc.subject.classification L52 en
dc.subject.classification L13 en
dc.subject.lcsh Commercial policy--Mathematical models en
dc.subject.lcsh Protectionism--Mathematical models en
dc.title Learning by doing, precommitment and infant-industry protection en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.internal.authorid UCD0042 en
dc.internal.availability Full text available en
dc.status Not peer reviewed en
dc.type.capturetechnique PDFimage en
dc.neeo.contributor Leahy|Dermot|aut| en
dc.neeo.contributor Neary|J. Peter |aut|UCD0042 en

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