<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<feed xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
<title>Law Research Collection</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10197/3656" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle/>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10197/3656</id>
<updated>2013-05-23T18:55:20Z</updated>
<dc:date>2013-05-23T18:55:20Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>Internet Filtering: Rhetoric, Legitimacy, Accountability and Responsibility</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10197/4271" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>McIntyre, T. J.</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Scott, Colin</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10197/4271</id>
<updated>2013-04-22T12:03:22Z</updated>
<published>2008-10-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Internet Filtering: Rhetoric, Legitimacy, Accountability and Responsibility
McIntyre, T. J.; Scott, Colin
This paper argues that the automatic and opaque nature of internet filtering, together with the fact that it is generally implemented by intermediaries, raises new problems for the law and in particular may tend to undermine aspects of freedom of expression.&#13;
&#13;
The paper starts by challenging the rhetoric underlying the use of the term “filtering” and suggests that the use of other terms such as "blocking" or "censorware" may be more appropriate.&#13;
&#13;
It then considers where filtering fits into the modalities of governance and the resulting issues of legitimacy and accountability. As regards legitimacy it argues that the use of technology to exert control over internet speech frequently undermines aspects of the rule of law concerning both the process for and content of norms governing behaviour. In relation to accountability, the paper argues that where it is not clear what is being blocked, why, or by whom, the operation of mechanisms of accountability - whether by way of judicial review, media scrutiny, or otherwise - is greatly reduced.&#13;
&#13;
Finally the paper suggests that, as compared with control through legal instruments, filtering may rob users of moral agency or responsibility in their use of the internet, with the implication that they may freely do whatever it is technically possible to do, with no necessity of moral engagement in their activities.
</summary>
<dc:date>2008-10-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fenians, Foreigners and Jury Trials in Ireland 1865-69</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10197/4260" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Howlin, Niamh</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10197/4260</id>
<updated>2013-04-18T16:38:26Z</updated>
<published>2010-08-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Fenians, Foreigners and Jury Trials in Ireland 1865-69
Howlin, Niamh
</summary>
<dc:date>2010-08-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>The Terror of Their Lives: Irish Jurors Experiences</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10197/4259" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Howlin, Niamh</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10197/4259</id>
<updated>2013-04-18T16:32:16Z</updated>
<published>2011-08-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">The Terror of Their Lives: Irish Jurors Experiences
Howlin, Niamh
A commentator noted in 1881 that Irishmen regarded jury service as “the greatest burden that can be inflicted upon them … they would be delighted if trial by jury was suspended tomorrow.” He later added, “[o]f course an enormous outcry would be raised about it in the national press, and in public meetings; but jurors … would give anything in the world not to serve … because it is the terror of their lives.” Much has been written about the poor state of the nineteenth-century Irish jury system, and it is certainly true that for various social, economic and political reasons, in comparison with that in England, the Irish system appears to have operated in a way that fell somewhat short of ideal. This article seeks to provide an understanding of the realities facing the jurors themselves, and will examine their experiences of the justice system before, during, and after the trial.
</summary>
<dc:date>2011-08-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Controlling Jury Composition in Nineteenth-Century Ireland</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10197/4258" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Howlin, Niamh</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10197/4258</id>
<updated>2013-04-18T16:30:10Z</updated>
<published>2009-12-02T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Controlling Jury Composition in Nineteenth-Century Ireland
Howlin, Niamh
Difficulties in securing convictions in nineteenth-century Ireland led the authorities&#13;
to resort to various methods of ensuring that petty juries delivered guilty verdicts in&#13;
cases where this was clearly warranted by the evidence. This article examines some&#13;
of the ‘stratagems’ put forward by David Johnson and suggests a number of other&#13;
practices which were used, arguing that many of these mechanisms centred around&#13;
controlling the composition of trial juries. Examples included altering the property&#13;
qualifications for jurors, the system of asking jurors to ‘stand aside’ and the use of&#13;
fines to compel attendance. While some of these were the legitimate exercise of&#13;
established procedures, it will be seen that the crown on occasion abused or overused&#13;
its powers.
</summary>
<dc:date>2009-12-02T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
</feed>
