This paper extends the results of Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988) on the existence of equilibrium in anonymous sequential games. They prove existence in the case where the aggregate distribution of agents' characteristics ...
Bergin, James(Queen’s University. Department of Economics, 1989)
This paper develops a general repeated game model over arbitrary time domain (which includes continuous time behaviour). A player is committed at any point in time to history independent behaviour for a positive length of ...
In this paper we present a general framework for the discussion of renegotiation in repeated games, provide a new concept of "renegotiation-proof" equilibrium, and show how the framework clarifies and unifies existing work. ...
Bergin, James(Queen’s University. Department of Economics, 1987)
This paper provides a formulation of continuous time repeated games of complete information. A substantial part of the paper is concerned with the definition of a continuous time strategy and the association of outcomes ...
In this paper we develop a model of strategic behaviour in continuous time
games of complete information, which includes conventional repeated games
in discrete time as a special case. The model developed here admits a ...
Bergin, James(Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 1992-08)
This paper examines the role of the player type distributions in repeated zero sum games of incomplete information with discounting of payoffs. In particular the strategic "sufficiency" of the posterior distributions for ...