We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of ...
We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of ...
This paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and,
because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the ...
We characterize optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an ...
We adopt a structural approach to studying the effects of public transfers on consumption smoothing, risk sharing and welfare in small village economies. We calibrate the key parameters of a dynamic limited commitment model ...
This article highlights and demonstrates the new requirements variable and partly unpredictable wind power will bring to unit commitment and power system operations.
Current practice is described and contrasted against ...
As wind power penetration grows, the amount of reserve needed on the system also grows, due to the increases in the uncertainty of wind power, which grows larger as forecast horizon increases. By scheduling the system more ...
The stochastic nature of wind alters the unit commitment and dispatch problem. By accounting for this uncertainty when scheduling the system, more robust schedules are produced, which should, on average, reduce expected ...
The paper examines how free trade can be sustained in a repeated tariff game in a simple two-country general equilibrium model. In the standard model, free trade can be sustained by "punishment strategies" with only a mild ...
This paper examines how time to build alters strategic investment behaviour under oligopoly. Facing demand uncertainty, firms decide whether to invest early or wait until
uncertainty has been resolved. A game that captures ...