Parlane, Sarah(University College Dublin. School Of Economics, 2005-12-08)
This paper analyses strategic market allocation by two auctioneers holding substitutes. It characterizes both the cooperative and competitive outcomes. Under cooperation or competition with close substitutes, bidders are ...
We characterize optimal IPO design in the presence of distinct adverse selection problems: one affecting the IPO stage and one arising in the after-market. Allocating shares to an investor with superior information in the ...
This paper examines student incentives when faced with a college admissions policy which pursues
student body diversity. The effect of a diversify-conscious admissions policy critically depends on
the design of the policy. ...
This paper characterizes the optimal and efficient mechanisms to allocate simultaneously two substitute tasks to two suppliers. Two main results emerge from this analysis. First, even under some regularity conditions ...
This paper extends Che and Gale (1998) by allowing the incumbent politician to have a preference for the policy position of one of the lobbyists. The effect of a contribution cap is analyzed where two lobbyists contest for ...
With politician preferences over policy outcomes, the effect of a contribution cap with monetary
penalties for exceeding the cap is starkly different from the case with an indifferent politician. In
contrast to Kaplan ...
Political campaign spending ceilings are purported to limit the incumbent's ability to exploit his fundraising advantage. If the challenger does not have
superior campaign effectiveness, in contrast to conventional wisdom, ...
Bergin, James; Zhou, Lin(Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2006-02)
In this paper we study the production and pricing of a good by a single supplier (such as a monopolist or government) under some given optimality criterion--for example, profit maximization or social benefit maximization. ...
This paper analyses procurement when contractors have limited liability and when the sponsor cannot commit to any specific form of future negotiation. It shows that introducing limited liability enhances competition and ...