In this paper we consider Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty. We prove existence of equilibrium when there is a general state space representing aggregate uncertainty. When the economy is stationary and ...
In this paper we consider Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty. We prove existence of equilibrium when there is a general state space representing aggregate uncertainty. When the economy is stationary and ...
In this paper we extend a result of Jovanovic and Rosenthal (Anonymous sequential games, Journal of Mathematical Economics 17, 1988) on the existence of equilibrium in Anonymous Sequential Games. Jovanovic and Rosenthal ...
This paper extends the results of Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988) on the existence of equilibrium in anonymous sequential games. They prove existence in the case where the aggregate distribution of agents' characteristics ...
It is shown that the set of sequential equilibria of an infinitely repeated incomplete information game coincides with a family of markov chains (with a state space of player type distributions and payoffs). Corresponding ...
Bergin, James(Northwestern University. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1986-04)
For two-sided informatin infinitely repeated incomplete information games it is shown that any vector payoff can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium vector payoff if and only if there is a markov chain (with a state ...
This paper develops a dynamic evolutionary model in which agents make choices on the basis of relative performance criteria. We distinguish two classes of learned behavior: imitative dynamics and a new class of dynamics, ...
In this paper we develop a model of strategic behaviour in continuous time
games of complete information, which includes conventional repeated games
in discrete time as a special case. The model developed here admits a ...
Bergin, James(Queen’s University. Department of Economics, 1987)
This paper provides a formulation of continuous time repeated games of complete information. A substantial part of the paper is concerned with the definition of a continuous time strategy and the association of outcomes ...
This paper characterizes long-run outcomes for broad classes of symmetric games, when players select actions on the basis of average historical performance. Received wisdom is that when agent’s interests are partially ...
In this paper we present a general framework for the discussion of renegotiation in repeated games, provide a new concept of "renegotiation-proof" equilibrium, and show how the framework clarifies and unifies existing work. ...
Recent evolutionary models have introduced "small mutation rates" as a way of refining predictions of long-run behavior. We show that if mutation rates are allowed to vary across states, then mutations no longer narrow the ...
Recent evolutionary models have introduced "small mutation rates" as a way of refining predictions of long-run behavior. We show that this refinement effect can only be obtained by restrictions on how the magnitude of the ...
We study the implementation of social choice rules in incomplete information environments. A sufficiency condition called posterior reversal is given for extensive form implementation. The condition has a natural interpretation ...
We study the implementation of social choice rules in incomplete information environments. A sufficiency condition called posterior reversal is given for extensive form implementation. The condition has a natural interpretation ...
This paper develops a simple "instant-response" model of strategic behavior where players can react instantly to changing circumstances, but at the same time face some inertia after changing action. The framework is used ...
In this paper, we study implementation in “economic environments”. It is shown that there is a dense subset of the set of preference profiles such that given an arbitrary social choice function, f, and e>0, there exists ...
In this paper, we study implementation in "economic environments". It is shown that there is a dense subset of the set of preference profiles such that given an arbitrary social choice function, f and e > 0, there exits ...