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Browsing by Author "Leahy, Dermot"

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Absorptive capacity, R&D spillovers, and public policy

Leahy, Dermot ; Neary, J. Peter (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 2004-05)

Empirical evidence strongly suggests that R&D increases a firm’s "absorptive capacity" (its ability to absorb spillovers from other firms) as well as contributing directly to profitability. We explore the theoretical ...
Absorptive capacity, R&D spillovers, and public policy

Leahy, Dermot ; Neary, J. Peter (University College Dublin. Institute for the Study of Social Change (Geary Institute), 2003-10-20)

Empirical evidence strongly suggests that R&D increases a firm’s "absorptive capacity" (its ability to absorb spillovers from other firms) as well as contributing directly to profitability. We explore the theoretical ...
Export enhancing tariff protection with strategic precommitment

Leahy, Dermot (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 1994-03)

The import protection as export promotion thesis is examined from a positive and normative perspective in a series of two-stage games in which firms choose R&D and capacity in the first stage and quantity or price in the ...
Follow-my-leader FDI and collusion

Leahy, Dermot ; Pavelin, Stephen (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 2001-03)

This paper presents a simple model to illustrate the following idea: domestic rivals may be motivated to setup foreign production in the same country because the replication of each other’s foreign direct investment (FDI) ...
International R&D rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment

Leahy, Dermot ; Neary, J. Peter (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 1995-05-09)

We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of ...
International R&D rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment

Leahy, Dermot ; Neary, J. Peter (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 1995-08)

We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of ...
Learning by doing in international subsidy games

Leahy, Dermot (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 1993-05)

A series of two-period, three-stage games with learning by doing is developed. In the first stage firms choose first-period outputs. Then governments choose export subsidies. Finally firms choose second-period outputs. I ...
Learning by doing, precommitment and infant-industry protection

Leahy, Dermot ; Neary, J. Peter (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 1994-04-24)

This paper examines the implications for strategic trade policy of different assumptions about precommitment. In a dynamic oligopoly game with learning by doing, the optimal first-period subsidy is lower if firms cannot ...
Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industries

Leahy, Dermot ; Neary, J. Peter (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 1995-08)

This paper examines the free-market and socially-optimal outcomes in a dynamic oligopoly model with R&D spillovers. First-best optimal subsidies to R&D are higher when firms play strategically against each other, but lower ...
Robust rules for industrial policy in open economics

Leahy, Dermot ; Neary, J. Peter (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 2001-01-24)

The theory of strategic trade policy yields ambiguous recommendations for assistance to exporting firms in oligopolistic industries. However, some writers have suggested that investment subsidies are a more robust ...
Strategic and rent extracting tariffs in the presence of persuasive advertising

Leahy, Dermot (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 1993-12)

This paper examines positive and normative implications of tariffs in the presence of persuasive advertising. It demonstrates that protection affects imports, the domestic consumer price and the terms of trade directly and ...
Strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies

Neary, J. Peter ; Leahy, Dermot (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 1998-07-21)

We characterize optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an ...
Symmetric research joint ventures : cooperative substitutes and complements

Leahy, Dermot ; Neary, J. Peter (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 2004-05)

We introduce the concept of cooperative substitutes and complements, and use it to throw light on the conditions for a research joint venture to choose equal levels of R&D by all member firms. We show that the second-order ...
Time-to-build investment and uncertainty in oligopoly

Dewit, Gerda ; Leahy, Dermot (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 2002-02)

This paper examines how time to build alters strategic investment behaviour under oligopoly. Facing demand uncertainty, firms decide whether to invest early or wait until uncertainty has been resolved. A game that captures ...
Two-stage game models of international oligopoly

Leahy, Dermot (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 1993-03)

This paper reexamines the import protection as export promotion thesis in a series of two-stage games in which firms choose R&D and/or capacity in the first stage and quantity or price in the second. It is shown that a ...